For anyone to suggest that this broad spectrum activity will or can be completed in a year or two, no matter what the drive and determination, is to be very naive.

A good example is that of the multi role combat aircraft deal for the Air Force, which has been in the pipeline for the last several years, even after short-listing of the vendor to just one. Given these processes - and none of them can be short-circuited - it will be a miracle if the submarine deal can be contracted within the next three years. 

Then, if all goes well, the first vessel may be delivered after five to six years at the very earliest, say in 2023. Even if all six Scorpene submarines presently under construction at Mazagon Docks (MDL) are delivered in the period 2016-2023, a highly improbable scenario, our combat force will be just that number, as all other earlier boats would be three decades old or more, and overdue for scrapping. 

Outright purchase of at least four to six submarines through imports will then become inescapable unless preemptive action is taken now.

It might be said that such conservatism does not gel with an India now vibrant with enthusiasm, so let us look at how the much easier task of manufacture of frigates in India has progressed. 

MDL built the first six of these to a bought-out British design and fit them out, with small incremental upgrades, in eight years from 1972 to 1980. The next six, to an Indian design and with Russian assistance, took 20 years to build, from 1980 to 2000. 

Since then, in the last 14 years, four new ones have been built. So, the overall score of sixteen frigates in 42 years of building expertise is what MDL, our most capable shipyard, has to show, averaging one ship in more than two and a half years.

It is not surprising that six frigates have had to be purchased from Russia in the last few years and there are reports that at least three more of them - and possibly six - will have to be bought to make up deficiencies. There is little reason to believe that there are other firms in India that can do any better. A government conscious of its commitment to enhance combat readiness can ill afford to ignore this reality.

So, how do we 'Make in India'? First and foremost, appreciate the constraints and do not get carried away by false hopes. Recognise that to have a Navy of the required strength we need to have two shipyards each for building frigates as well as submarines. 

If one produces a platform every 24 months or so - ambitious given performance so far - two will produce 25 ships in the same number of years, thereby allowing a force level of 25 vessels to be maintained (which must be the minimum operational requirement) as older ones get scrapped in this same period. 

Setting up second production lines is easier said than done, as the Navy found when it ordered frigates at Garden Reach Shipyard, Kolkata, in the 1990s and then, disappointed with the results, discontinued it - in retrospect, a serious mistake which needs urgent rectification. Start of submarine manufacture in a second yard is equally important.

Recognise that despite all the investments that have been made in indigenous design and facilities, both in public and private shipyards, the targets prescribed in the perspective plans are unachievable by a purely 'Make' strategy and the earlier we adopt the 'Buy and Make' route, the better.

There are two other major platforms that are needed, aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. These are strategic platforms that need dedicated shipyards and those that are already involved in that task, one in the public and the other in the private sector, must be helped to consolidate and further enhance their core capacities. 

Then there are a range of other warships like corvettes, offshore patrol vessels, amphibious ships, tankers, minesweepers, hydrographic vessels, training ships, submarine rescue tenders, et al. Most of these can be designed and built in India and are well suited to being assigned to newer yards. Finally, appreciate that in no country has the military industry survived only on indigenous demand; exports have to be an essential adjunct.

Make in India will not come easily and the situation highlighted above is just about the Navy. The Army and the Air Force have different sets of complexities and problems and building tanks, aircraft and heavy guns is not just some ordinary manufacturing skill that can be acquired easily. 

We have to go about this highly technological and design-intensive activity in a carefully calibrated way. Appreciate that the lowest tender (L1) route is not best suited to defence needs where quality of product must take priority. 

If a product has to be imported, do not get caught up in multi-vendor bargaining-and machinations, but focus on established sources which offer credible transfer of technology. But all this requires a long-term production plan evaluating all available capacities holistically and then exploiting them to obtain what the Armed Forces need. 

As a start, let us do away with the terms "public sector and private sector" and replace them with one "national sector". These measures are essential prerequisites towards getting a defence capability that is made in India.